This writer recently listened to a podcast interview with the journalist Wolfgang Münchau, the tenor of which took a negative view of prospects for Europe, particularly Germany. The discussion about the perilous state of German and European industry certainly merits an extended consideration at some point, but for today I am most interested in a comment made near the end of the discussion. It concerned the culture of consensus within Germany, and how its political orientation, which has shaped industrial strategy and foreign policy for decades, is the product of the political class, major industries and other significant stakeholders developing a long-term common position. This can be highly successful for a period of time, when domestic and global conditions are conducive, and, importantly, when a decision treated in isolation has little to no further ramifications. 

The world is too interconnected for that approach to work all the time in the long run, especially now in a fracturing global system, when countries are being forced to choose who their friends are, and consequently who they are obliged to regard as adversaries, if not outright enemies. In Germany’s case consensus is not proving an advantage given the acute challenges they face, which are conspiring to pull the rug from under a favourable working arrangement. Estrangement from Russia has led to exorbitant energy costs that are crushing their industrial base. The bets made by German firms on making investments in China, which would have been quite astute taken in isolation, become potential liabilities as China itself becomes a high value manufacturing country and its economic rise becomes seen as a threat by the West. 

However, there are many countries that function according to a broadly agreed consensus. Such nations tend to have PR electoral systems, which fosters greater pragmatism than winner takes all polities. Ireland is another country with a model that for years has been endorsed by most of its power brokers. It has led to an open economy that has made the country an exemplar of high-tech neoliberalism, with effective state agencies that have been adept at attracting foreign direct investment. Enthusiasm for the European Union combined with what might be termed a fortunate geography from a defence and security perspective has meant that the kind of existential questions that occupy other nations aren’t central talking points in Ireland. But even that is coming under strain, as an anti-globalist, post-liberal mood becomes more ascendant around the world. 

The apparent solidity and assurance provided by consensus can therefore seem to be a weakness in a changing world. Consensus can breed a solipsism that fails to take account of a whole host of other factors, which will unavoidably impinge on your modus operandi. There eventually comes a time refresh one’s thinking, to formulate strategies that work better under new conditions, to construct narratives that respond more effectively to the most pertinent challenges, be they political, economic, environmental. 

It is with this in mind that this writer is contemplating a second Trump administration. Trumpism as a force has many characteristics, one of which is the breaking up of consensus. Political establishments plainly hate the chaos embodied by Trump, but he is a symptom rather than a cause of the turbulence of this moment in history, where liberalism has sunk into a profound crisis. We have lurched into a situation where you have a whole array of politicians from around the world that are described as “centre left” in a very facile sense, but who have been left holding the bag as the last defenders of an economic system most people despise, and which the right – which produced this system in the first place – seems to be moving on from. 

I might have said that Trump represents a rejection of consensus, but in one important sense that is not true. The United States is very much a country that, despite appearance, does have one important point of consensus, and that is forcing other countries to make choices. This is particularly true and excruciating for a number of countries in Europe, and one doesn’t have great confidence in how they will respond. This writer would prefer Europe to have a modus vivendi with Russia and a constructive relationship with China, but that feels unlikely to be permitted by our American “partners”, and the leadership of Europe has no appetite to take a strong independent line. A credible contingency plan for a multipolar world, covering such topics as energy, defence, AI and other fields of innovation where Europe will need to be a leader is notable by its absence.

Trumpian pandemonium should be seen as an opportunity to form a unity of purpose within Europe. A new consensus, if you like. But it will probably necessitate a clear out of most of the current leadership class in Europe before such a thing can realistically be contemplated. And how that might happen, with good replacements to come in, I can’t realistically contemplate. Things feel bleak, but maybe there is a new dawn on the way. This is a time of significant happenings, and with a bit of luck, a favourable equilibrium for Europe might yet present itself.